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"My only point in writing is that I never find myself in disagreement with you on matters of logic. Sometimes my taste for, say, bounded utility, differs from yours; but I understand and respect your view. Your position on SWF baffles me." (PASP, Samuelson to Arrow, April 30, 1976) 1 I. Introduction: the stakes of the controversy As notably emphasized by Sen (1999: 351) , in the speech he delivered in Stockholm for the reception of his Nobel Prize on December 8, 1998 "for his contributions to welfare economics," the death of welfare economics has been declared several times. One of the reasons cited for these plural obituaries is that Kenneth Arrow's impossibility theorem, as set Although six short years separated the country boy Paul (born in Indiana in 1915) from the young Kenneth (born in New York in 1921) , their respective educations and curricula followed two very different paths. Samuelson came from a rather prosperous Polish family and began his undergraduate studies in economics at Chicago at the age of 16. By World War II, the "enfant terrible emeritus" had turned out paper after paper as a Harvard junior fellow from 1937-1940, completed his Wells Prize-awarded PhD dissertation, and been appointed Assistant Professor at MIT (Samuelson 1983; Backhouse 2014 Backhouse , 2015 ). Samuelson's profound interest in welfare economics, as well as his fellow student and longtime friend Bergson's, thus began during the interwar period in the middle of the socialist calculation debates and soon after Robbins's 1932 Essay firmly rejected the use of values in economics. According to Cherrier and Fleury (2017: 4) , "an 'organicist' (to use Buchanan's terms) view of the State then prevailed, so that the values guiding its action were not conceived as deriving from individual choices." The B-S SWF is no exception to this rule. As depicted by Bergson (1982) and Samuelson (1981 Samuelson ( , 1983 , its elaboration goes back to their Harvard days together during the late thirties, when both tried to understand the subtleties and obscurities of Pareto's Manuel, Samuelson thus serving as a "helpful midwife" for Bergson's 1938 Quarterly Journal of Economics paper (Samuelson in Suzumura 2005: 334) . 3 In this paper, Bergson (then still Burk at that time) develops a function he calls the "economic welfare function" which aims at defining the social welfare from the set of resources available in the society. He then defines different groups of value propositions currently used in the welfare literature at that time to determine the conditions for a welfare maximum and examines how their derivations constrain the shape of the economic welfare function and thus the maximum position. He made clear that "the number of sets [of value propositions] is infinite, and in any particular case the selection of one of them must be determined by its compatibility with the values prevailing in the community the welfare of which is being studied" (Bergson 1938: 323) , but with no attempt to derive these values from individual preferences. When turning his 1940 PhD dissertation into the Foundations of Economic Analysis (1947), Samuelson added a whole chapter on welfare economics (Backhouse 2015) and further developed Bergson's seminal insights. He promptly introduced the concept of an individualistic social welfare function, 4 ordinally defined, which aims at ordering in a transitive way the different states of the world and at reflecting "some ethical belief-that of a benevolent despot, or a 3 For a full account of the origins of the B-S SWF, see Backhouse 2013. 4 When speaking about a B-S SWF, most of the subsequent authors in fact refer to an individualistic social welfare function, unless explicitly specified. In the rest of the paper, the B-S SWF should thus be understood as an individualistic social welfare function in Samuelson's sense. complete egotist, or 'all men of good will', a misanthrope, the state, race, or group mind, God, etc." (Samuelson 1947: 221) . One of its main assumptions is that "individuals' preferences are to 'count,'" i.e. "if any movement leaves an individual on the same indifference curve, then the social welfare function is unchanged, and similarly for an increase or decrease" (223).
Then, Samuelson shows that a set of optimality conditions, as later coined Pareto optimality by Little (1950) , are necessary to obtain an optimum, but they are not sufficient: further ethical judgments are required to frame a complete ordering. Concretely, a B-S SWF "ethically orders the various states of the world" and "lets 'individual tastes count,' in the sense of agreeing with individuals' orderings when those orderings are unanimous and resolving them ethically when they are not unanimous" (Samuelson 1981: 224) .
On the other hand, Arrow's undergraduate education at City College of New York (majoring in mathematics) was made possible only by the financial sacrifices of his "extremely poor" Romanian parents (Arrow in Kelly 1987: 45) . He then received a M.A. in Mathematics in June 1941 from Columbia and finally "switched to Economics from Mathematics" because Hotelling was able to secure a fellowship there (46) . Soon forced to interrupt his graduate study to serve in the US Army from 1942-1946, Arrow spent the following years partly at Columbia, and partly at the Cowles Commission in Chicago, continuously postponing writing his Hicksian PhD dissertation, to the despair of his closest mentors at Columbia, Hotelling and Wald. In the spring of 1948, then at Cowles, he became interested in elections and rapidly developed the equivalent of Duncan Black's singlepeakedness theorem, before discovering one month later that the exact same idea had been published by the latter in the June 1948 issue of the Journal of Political Economy (Black 1948) . It was thus on the basis of his mainly mathematical studies that, shortly after this episode, Arrow began to devise his landmark impossibility theorem. Its statement is wellknown: there is no social welfare function able to satisfy a set of four "reasonable" value judgments shared by the members of democratic societies: In Arrow's terminology (1948 Arrow's terminology ( , 1950 Arrow's terminology ( , 1951a , a social welfare function is a rule or a procedure which determines a social ordering on the basis of the individual orderings of all possible states of the world, with no resort to interpersonal comparisons of utility. Both kinds of orderings (individual, social) are required to be complete and transitive. This impossibility result applies to democratic voting, the market, and social welfare, Arrow claimed.
From the very start, Arrow kept asserting that it has direct and devastating consequences for the B-S SWF (1948, 1950, 1951a, 1963) , though he seemed to soften his position in the early eighties. On his side, especially from the seventies on, Samuelson remained active on this issue and continued to defend the concept he had devised with Bergson, tooth and nail, against Arrow's attacks (1967 Arrow's attacks ( , 1977 Arrow's attacks ( , 1981 Arrow's attacks ( , 1987 Arrow's attacks ( , 2005 . Mostly focused on the technical side of the polemic, the arguments put forth by Arrow, Samuelson, and their respective allies progressively overlooked its other aspects, although key factors to explain its depth, persistence, as well as its virulence, remained almost hidden from general economists. Indeed, one can point out no less than four dimensions in this long-lasting confrontation, each closely imbricated the others. First, the most obvious dimension is the technical one: in fact, Arrow had developed a new and original formalism which represents "preference by a notation not customarily employed in economics, though familiar in mathematics and particularly in symbolic logic" (1951a: 11) and clearly stresses that "the representation of the choice mechanism by ordering relations [...] has certain advantages for the present analysis over the more conventional representations in terms of indifference maps or utility functions" (16) traditionally used by the pre-war welfare economists. This new formalism, of course far from being neutral, leads to two main technical differences regarding the controversy I am dealing with. On the one hand, it radically modifies the kind of variables welfare economists were used to considering: while the individual preferences are given for welfare economics, Arrow's framework takes into consideration all possible configurations of individual preferences (also called profiles), which is senseless from a welfare economist's point of view (Mongin 2002) . Insofar as they involve more than one profile, the conditions of universal domain and of independence of irrelevant alternatives are specified interprofile, while the two remaining conditions are intraprofile. On the other hand, the informational bases required by both social welfare functions are different, as pointed out by Arrow as early as 1963 (110): 5 This very brief description follows the formulation adopted by Arrow in the second edition of Social Choice and Individual Values (1963: 97) , as well as Weintraub (1975: 83) for the statement of the two last conditions. The [Bergson-Samuelson] social welfare function was to depend on indifference maps; in other words, welfare judgments were to be based only on interpersonally observable behavior. The Condition of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives extends the requirement of observability one step farther. Given the set of alternatives available for society to choose among, it could be expected that, ideally, one could observe all preferences among the available alternatives, but there would be no way to observe preferences among alternatives not feasible for society. The austerity imposed by this condition is perhaps stricter than necessary.
Even if it is too strict, Arrow then stressed that the independence of irrelevant alternatives is advantageous, for it is satisfied both by the electoral system and the market for "the decentralization of knowledge which is such a virtue of the market mechanism is incompatible with the use of utility comparisons among irrelevant alternatives in arriving at resource allocations." Two complementary remarks can be made at this stage: first, due to the above-mentioned interprofile character of the condition of independence of irrelevant alternatives, no serious technical attempt was made by Samuelson and other welfare economists to clarify this specific point of divergence with Arrow's framework. Second, the B-S SWF is indeed ordinal, though permitting interpersonal comparisons of "irrelevant alternatives"; i.e. of indifference curves. 6 Indeed, in some places in the Foundations (244) and elsewhere, it seems that Samuelson permits a resort to interpersonal comparisons of utility, which embarrassed social choice theorists and led to many misinterpretations one way or the other: "you seriously misunderstand me if you think I have ever believed that only Paretooptimality is meaningful […] . Vulgar Chicagoans sometimes do but their vulgarities are not mine" (PASP, Samuelson to Suzumura, May 7, 1993 , not finished, not sent), adding later that "anyone who excludes interpersonal comparisons of individual utilities will get no reliance at all from Pareto efficiency" (PASP, Samuelson to Suzumura, May 21, 2004) . One has to wait a 2005 Fleurbaey and Mongin paper to find a real clarification on this subtle issue.
Second, the different formalisms used by Samuelson and Bergson on the one hand, on the other hand by Arrow, reflect two radically distinct conceptions of social welfare (Amadae 2003 , Saito 2011 , Cherrier and Fleury 2017 . In other words, contrary to Bergson, Samuelson, and the pre-war welfare economics, the Arrovian social welfare function boils down to deriving collective choice from individual preferences. It is only in the early 2000s that 6 Fleurbaey (2003: 376) noted that the Borda rule meets both requirements: the Borda scores are not altered by monotonic changes in the corresponding individual utility functions, although they are interpersonally comparable. Arrow (1963 Arrow ( , 2014 referred as well to the Borda rule as an example of a function which allows interpersonal comparisons based on indifference maps. Samuelson (in Suzumura 2005: 341) clearly acknowledged his difference with Arrow on this generally overlooked issue:
Arrow wanted to find out how an individualistic Bergson-Samuelson social welfare function could be generated democratically. But I should register a difference in opinion here. Arrow has said more than once that any theory of ethics boils down to how the individuals involved feel about ethics. I strongly disagree. I think every one of us as individuals knows that our orderings are imperfect. They are inconsistent; they are changeable; they come back. […] There are no ideal individuals who, as adults, suddenly become these perfect individuals. People talk about paternalism as if we were bowing down to a dictator, but it is wrong in ethics to rule out imposition, and even dictatorship, because that is the essence of ethics.
In his correspondence, Samuelson was even clearer on this point: "understand that every
Bergson-Samuelson SWF is 'imposed' in the same sense that this is implied by all ethical systems. Even in its special 'individualistic' form, don't expect that each person's views on it are 'respected'" (PASP, Samuelson to Suzumura, May 7, 1993 , not finished, not sent).
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The third dimension of the polemic concerns the academic communities intertwined in it: whereas the axiomatic method used by Arrow, which itself conveyed his alternative conception of social welfare, became the standard way to address issues of social welfare and justice, the welfare economics tradition progressively declined, due both to its incapacity to attract new young adherents and its failure to answer Arrow's attack in a proper and convincing way (Mongin 2002 , Amadae 2003 , Suppes 2005 . This tendency was accompanied by the irresistible emergence of the social choice community, which has, according to Samuelson, unduly Samuelson's bitterness towards Arrow in this matter is part of the fourth dimension of this controversy, i.e., the personal part. Indeed, although my investigation by no means amounts to saying that there exists a kind of hidden long-lasting disregard or antagonism between these two great economists which my narrative would reveal, it is clear that this specific issue corresponds to an "important" point of disagreement between them (339), never resolved. It may be recalled here as well that their two families were affiliated. One of the 7 Arrow never acknowledged the specificity of the B-S SWF on this issue as compared with his own result. On the contrary, he explicitly stressed his difference with Buchanan (1954) almost from the start: "Buchanan's positivism is more extreme. Choice is only individual, the very concept of social welfare is inadmissible " (1963: 107) . Besides, Arrow never took an active part in the Public Choice Society activities or meetings (in Feiwel 1987b: 233 (and vice versa) , may be key elements to explain why this controversy lasted so many years and, above all, remained almost hidden from most general economists: "I love Ken Arrow. He is almost a blood brother. But I never ceased wishing that early on he had not again and again told his readers that" his social welfare function is no more a B-S SWF "than an orange is an apple" (PASP, Samuelson to Suzumura and Little, April 15, 2005) .
The aim of this paper is precisely to examine this rather strange controversy, which is almost unknown in the scientific community, even though it lasted more than fifty years and saw a conflict between two economic giants, Arrow and Samuelson, and behind them two Before going to the core of the paper, two extra precautions must be stated. First, according to Mongin (2002: 147 ), Arrow's celebrated theorem resulted in a separation of welfare economics into two different branches: "social choice theory on the one hand, and public economics on the other", the latter having "absorbed much of the content of the 'new welfare economics' that had survived social-choice-theoretic criticism." I am dealing here with the former branch only, knowing that the controversy at stake in this paper essentially took place within it. Second, one could argue that this bizarre controversy only occurred because of the unfortunate use by Arrow of the term "social welfare function," as Samuelson (1981: 228) sometimes seems to claim: [Arrow] used the same name for his unicorn that Bergson and other writers had used for their existent animals. So it is not particularly surprising that Arrow's readers, learning that he had proved the impossibility of a 'social welfare function,' should have formed the mistaken inference that there cannot exist a reasonable and well-behaved Bergsonian social welfare function.
In these circumstances, this controversy, and therefore indeed this article, would be pointless.
Yet here I try to show that the use by Arrow of these three specific words was by no means by coincidence or pure chance. Quite the contrary: Arrow did it deliberately because he truly believed that his impossibility theorem directly impacted the B-S SWF -something on which Samuelson never agreed. In a nutshell, if the specific topic of my paper had to be summarized in six words, almost an alexandrine, they would definitely be the following: "your position on SWF baffles me" (PASP, Samuelson to Arrow, April 30, 1976) -no more, no less. remarked that he had difficulty understanding how countries or collectivities could have utility functions like individual players do. Although " [Arrow] hadn't spent a lot of time or attention on welfare economics" (Arrow in Kelly 1987: 52) , he promptly replied that "it had been answered by Abram Bergson's notion of the social welfare function" (Arrow 1983a: 3) . Very interested in this matter, Helmer then suggested he write an exposition of how this concept could be used in this specific context. During the course of the summer at RAND, Arrow rapidly developed his famous theorem and before his return to Chicago, Arrow had worked out the substance of what would become the founding stone of social choice theory. Even without fully realizing what he had achieved, Arrow felt from the outset that his discovery was "significant" (Arrow in Kelly 1987: 54) , and would at least furnish a topic for his PhD dissertation.
II. Social Choice and Individual Values and its aftermath
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On the influence of Tarski on Arrow's work on social choice, see Suppes (2005) . On this period, see also Feiwel (1987ab) and Düppe and Weintraub (2014) . As with the compensationist avenue, whose failures had already been exposed, his result would thus prove that the other main road taken by the new welfare economists, foremost among them Bergson and Samuelson, is threatened as well.
After a number of seminars during the fall of 1948, he read his research at the December 1948 meeting of the Econometric Society in Cleveland in a session chaired by Lawrence Klein. According to Arrow's recollections (in Kelly 1987: 56) , the audience didn't react very strongly, either pro or con, except for a "contentious Canadian, David McCord Wright":
I thought under the circumstances, I got a pretty good reception. I don't think anybody said 'We've seen a revolution before our eyes,' but it was taken as a serious contribution. I wonder why it was accepted so well. There really was no resistance. It made my reputation.
This successful story as well as the decisive anecdote involving Helmer is however nuanced by an intriguing letter from Marschack, at the Cowles, to Bergson (ABP, Marschak to Bergson, July 13, 1948): when you were here you started to tell me about ideas of yours concerning the objectivity of values. You suggested to application of symbolic logic to this problem of ethics. […] Concretely, will you consider giving a paper on the subject during the Christmas meetings of the Econometric Society in Cleveland?
As we know now, this is not Bergson, but Arrow who presented such a paper during this 1948 meeting, using symbolic logic and objectifying values in the sense that his social welfare 9 Having first adopted the terminology "impossibility theorem," Arrow decided to change it on the advice of Tjalling Koopmans, who "thought that was too pessimistic" (Arrow in Kelly, 1987: 56) . This anecdote is also recalled in Arrow (2014: 58). function is deduced from individual preferences, with no recourse to external ethical considerations. Knowing that Arrow was in Chicago as well during the spring 1948, the coincidence of dates is no less than puzzling. The safest conclusion is that the idea to use symbolic logic in connection with values was already in the air at the Cowles before Arrow left to the RAND. At any rate, it seems that Bergson inadvertently gave the tools to destroy his own function. But no more can be inferred from this: Bergson himself confessed "some puzzlement" when Arrow sent him his manuscript in December 1948 (ABP, Bergson to Arrow, December 16, 1948) . In January 1949 simply means that the B-S SWF does not demand any consistency between the change in individual preferences or tastes and the change in social order, contrary to Arrow's: "if tastes change, we may expect a new ordering of all the conceivable states; but we do not require the difference between the new and the old ordering should bear any particular relation to the change of tastes which have occurred" (Little 1952a: 423) .
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According to the British economist, Arrow takes this consistency into account through the (interprofile) condition of irrelevance of independent alternatives, which corresponds to a specific value judgment which is far from self-evident: "at all events, I know that I should hate to commit myself a priori to Arrow's value judgment" (425).
On the other hand, attacking the conception of social welfare conveyed by Arrow's theorem, Little discusses the term "social" by arguing that a B-S SWF is not social in the sense that it does not reflect the point of view of the whole of society, but only the values or opinion of one specific individual, who ordered the states of society. He then asserts that Arrow's function can be better seen as a decision-making process, a kind of "machine" able to produce a decision from the n individual sentences or opinions. Following this line of reasoning, Bergson (1954) makes a distinction between counseling individual citizens on the basis of their social welfare judgments and counseling public officials who are ethically neutral and who only seek to implement citizens' values as given by some collective choice rule. According to Bergson, the former is the true objective of welfare economics, although he 11 On this issue, see also Bergson (1954: 247) : "if there is a change in the individual ordering, necessarily there is a corresponding change in the Social Welfare Function." concedes that the latter could be seen as another kind of welfare economics. It should be noted that on these issues Samuelson's view differs from both Little's and Bergson's, for he claims that "there is no reason why a welfare function which embodies the creed of a single individual should not be called a social welfare function. Moreover, there may be many more such welfare functions than there are individuals, e.g. we can invent creeds to talk about which no living or dead individual holds" (PASP, Samuelson to Little, February 13, 1952) . In this 1952 paper, in order to illustrate how the B-S SWF is impacted by his result, Arrow presents an individual named Primus who has the difficult task to propose a new ordering both on the basis of his own ethical viewpoint and of the preferences of all the other individuals of the society. For the conditions Arrow states are "value judgments which might reasonably be part of the ethics of Primus", Primus "will find […] that he cannot construct a preference scale which would express his ethical choices among various distributions and would be in accord with these value judgements" (481 and 56).
But it is only in an appended commentary (chap. VIII) to the second edition of his famous 1951 book that Arrow fully reacted to the subsequent literature and responded to the criticisms raised by Bergson in 1952 and . After paying lip service to his misuse of the term "social welfare function" and opting instead for the term "constitution," following the suggestion made by Kemp and Asimakopulos (1952) , he underlines that "the difference, however, is largely terminological; to have a social welfare function in Bergson's sense, there must be a constitution" (1963: 105). As a matter of fact, a large part of chapter VIII is devoted to meticulous refutations of Bergson's and Little's every argument. First, the "preferences as given" argument is swept away, for Bergson's function could be presumably shaped for any given set of individual preferences. Second, while accepting Little's distinction between a decision-making process and a welfare judgment, Arrow adds immediately that "in [his] view a social decision process serves as a proper explication for the intuitive idea of social welfare" (106). He then fully endorses Bergson's statement regarding the other possible task of welfare economics as counseling public officials. He even denies the relevance of the first main approach of welfare economic described by Bergson, i.e. counseling individuals, claiming that "'social welfare' is related to social policy in any sensible interpretation; the welfare judgments formed by any single individual are unconnected with action and therefore sterile" (106). Consequently, the general possibility theorem cannot but fully belong to welfare economics, contrary to Little's and Bergson's claims "and also Samuelson"' -adding rather provocatively that "one can hardly think of a less interesting question about my theorem than whether it falls on one side or another of an arbitrary boundary separating intellectual provinces" (108). Finally, Arrow clearly states that the aim of the Bergson-Samuelson formulation was to go beyond the implications of Paretooptimality, unable to make any choices among Pareto-optimal alternatives; in other words, "to extend the unanimity quasi-ordering to a full social ordering," which precisely corresponds to his own aim. On this matter, he considers that his own constitution is nothing less than a logical extension of Bergson's But the second important movement of this controversy in the seventies, which focuses on the crucial "preferences as given" argument will take one step further and contribute to accentuating the confusion.
III. Kemp-Ng and the focus on the single-profile issue
After his 1967 paper in the Hook proceedings, it seems that for a while Samuelson The papers by Parks and by Kemp and Ng both aim at showing that "it is impossible to find a 'reasonable' Bergson-Samuelson SWF based on individual orderings" (Kemp and Ng, 1976: 59) . In other words, according to all three scholars, a B-S SWF cannot exist without interpersonal comparisons, thus stressing the similarity of their impossibility theorem with Arrow's conclusions. The basic idea of these papers is to adapt the conditions devised by Arrow when one considers that individual preferences are given, i.e., for a single profile of individual preferences. One can summarize this basic idea as follows: the condition of universal domain, the weak Pareto principle and the condition of non-dictatorship are stated in a slightly different way, but the real innovation is to devise a condition of neutrality, which is, according to the authors, the companion of the condition of the independence of irrelevant alternatives, but in the context of given individual preferences (Kemp and Ng, 1976: 61; Parks, 1976: 448) . The condition of neutrality implies that the social welfare function treats 12 Arrow's result can thus be defined as a multi-profile impossibility theorem for it deals with all the possible configurations of individual preferences. all the alternatives the same way and can be stated as follows: if a particular subprofile of individual preferences for x against y results in a social preference for x over y, and the same subprofile of individual preferences holds for z against w, then z is socially preferred to w. At the end, it is shown that in these circumstances there is no social welfare function satisfying the four conditions. This brief presentation of the condition of neutrality and of the subsequent theorem follows Pollak (1979: 76-77) . As stressed by Fleurbaey and Mongin (2005) , both Parks's and Kemp and Ng's papers (1976 and after) encounter some drawbacks in their development. 14 In the acknowledgments, Kemp and Ng note that while preparing their paper, they came across an unpublished work by Robert Parks (1973) . On the other hand, Robert Parks did not mention Kemp and Ng's note. Suppose society has to share 100 chocolates between 2 selfish hedonists. The condition of neutrality implies that "if it is ethically better to take something (say 1 or, alternatively, say 50 chocolates) from Person 1 who had all the chocolates in order to give to Person 2 who had none, then it must be ethically preferable to give all the chocolates to Person 2" (Samuelson 1977: 83) .
Third, in some places in this material, Samuelson seems to criticize Arrow's (mis)use of the notion of Pareto-optimality. This is very clearly expressed in a letter to Kemp, where Samuelson literally orders him to add some clarificatory formula to his 1976 paper with Ng Closely scrutinized, the problem Samuelson encountered with Arrow's use of Paretooptimality, i.e., in a multi-profile framework and whatever the modifications of the other "irrelevant" alternatives, seems to have some relationship with the "independence" property of the Pareto principle revealed by Sen in his "Paretian epidemic" (1976) . Indeed, according to Sen, an indefatigable detractor of the Pareto principle, notably through his liberal paradox (1970) , this principle includes two features: a quite uncontroversial unanimous aspect saying that if everyone has the same preference over all the social states, then social choice should reflect it; and an "independence" property saying that the social choice over a pair must depend only on individual preferences over that pair (1976: 220) . Of course, one cannot but point out that the latter feature has many similarities with the independence of irrelevant alternatives. Thus, Samuelson's focus on Arrow's Pareto condition is of the same kind as the criticisms formulated by Sen's "Paretian epidemic," but in a more intuitive and incomplete way. As such, it could simply be another way for Samuelson to express his disapproval regarding Arrow's formalism.
Eventually, in spite of Samuelson's convincing argument against the neutrality condition and Pollak's (1979) attempt to clarify the debate, 18 it seems that the social choice theoretical reading has been more convincing than that of the other camp. According to Fleurbaey and Mongin (2005: 382) , "the message got across the non-specialists, and it became part of the official history of economics that a major refutation had taken place. If the official death of welfare economics were to be dated with some precision, the years 1976-1979 would suggest themselves." In addition, constituting a kind of bridge between social choice theory and welfare economics, the important works of Sen (1970 Sen ( , 1977 Sen ( , 1979 and others on the social welfare functionals -i.e. a mechanism which specifies a social ordering from a set of individual utility functions -and the different levels of interpersonal comparisons, strengthened the view that the translation from one framework to another was straightforward.
In this perspective, the B-S SWF can be considered either as a kind of truism (Sen 1977 (Sen : 1563 (Sen -1564 or, at best, as a rather useless concept in the sense that it cannot provide "a real guide to action" (Chipman 1982: 175) . Definitely, it seems that the subtleties of the technical debate have led to throw out the B-S baby with the bathwater.
IV. Arrow's ambiguities and the institutionalization of the social choice community
Except for his Nobel Prize lecture mentioned above, Arrow remained silent on the controversy during his Harvard years in the seventies, even as the literature on social choice grew explosively.
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One of the reasons for this could be that he had nothing more to say on the topic absent any further clarification from his opponents. Indeed, from the start, he had Whose behavior or whose judgments is referred to in the social welfare function is never clarified. Presumably, the function is an expression of the ethical attitudes of any particular observer, but this attitude leaves open all the problems which center about the concept of political or social obligation; why should any individual accept policies inconsistent with his 18 "The essential feature of the Bergson-Samuelson problem is its concern with ethical evaluation, not its single profile perspective" (Pollak 1979: 75) . In the acknowledgments, Pollak states that he is "grateful to Paul A. Samuelson for calling my attention to Kemp and Ng (1976) , and for helpful conversations, but this should not be taken to imply his endorsement of the views expressed." own social welfare function? Even apart from this profoundly difficult problem of political ethics, the development of the social welfare function as a tool for policy formation seems curiously stunted. Certainly no attempt is made to show how specific policies follow from specific choices of social welfare functions, not even by way of example (Arrow 1967b: 736). In the past, albeit less explicitly, Arrow had already stressed the weaknesses of Bergson's and Samuelson's approach for its lack of concrete examples apart from those based on the sum of utilities, the latter being not in line with their ordinalist attitude (Arrow 1952: 475) . In view of these criticisms, it is not surprising that Arrow decided to give a rather substantive clarification about his own position on the debate shortly after Samuelson's 1977 (Samuelson 1981: 223) . In this paper, he pursued the work he had briefly outlined in 1967 in order to precisely differentiate Arrow's function and the B-S SWF. To do so, he lists all possible profiles for two individuals and three social states. He then enunciates all of B-S possible functions (any Paretian ordering enters into this category) and Arrow's (none!), the objective of this manoeuvre being to demonstrate without any ambiguity that B-S SWFs do exist. But, again, and now no longer surprisingly, no criticism of the condition of independence of irrelevant alternatives is raised.
Although Arrow also took part in the Bergson Festschrift, he carefully avoided the polemic by stating from the outset that "in this chapter, I will follow Bergson in his view that a social welfare function is characteristic of an individual" (Arrow 1981: 267-268 ). Arrow wrote his paper in May 1979, so he should have at least been aware of Samuelson's 1977 paper, although it is not cited. It was only two years later, in a tribute book to Samuelson edited by two of his longtime colleagues at MIT, Robert Solow and Cary Brown, that Arrow directly replied to Samuelson on this issue for the first time. At first sight, he seems to endorse Samuelson's point of view, especially as stressed in 1981, by explicitly stating that "if there are 'rumors that Kenneth's Arrow Impossibility Theorem rendered Bergson's social welfare function somehow nonexistent or self-contradictory,' they are indeed 'quite confused'" (Arrow 1983b: 21) . Referring to Szpilrajn's theorem already mentioned by Sen (1977 Sen ( : 1564 fn 36) for the very same purpose, 20 Arrow clearly enunciates that the B-S SWF cannot but exist since the Pareto relation can always be extended to a social ordering. Thanks to a precise demonstration which Samuelson never developed himself, he even shows formally how the B-S SWF is compatible with non-comparable ordinalism, 
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"A change from one index of utility to another for each individual, accompanied by a corresponding change in the social welfare function that 'undoes' the transformations of individual utility functions leaves the social ordering unchanged" (Arrow 1983b: 22-23 Samuelson's ideas?" (KJAP, Kelly to Arrow, March 26, 1986 ). Arrow's answer has no room for ambiguity:
Samuelson, for some reason, takes the social welfare function as defined for a fixed profile (he does not regard the intra-profile conditions of Parks and others as reasonable.) He simply does not consider inter-profile conditions. He has regarded the Impossibility Theorem as relevant to mathematical politics, not economics: by this, I understand him to mean that the Independence conditions is valid for elections as a matter of fact. But he does not wish to impose it on social welfare functions. I cannot myself see how one can deny that the SWF will vary with the profile and that it would be reasonable to impose some conditions on the variation of the social ordering with respect to the profile, if only continuity assumptions. But he has not seen fit to address this point (KJAP, Arrow to Kelly, undated 22 ).
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According to the rest of their exchange, this letter was written between March 26, 1986 and May 26, 1986. Even if most parts of Arrow's answer are not very surprising, since Samuelson himself had very clearly set out his point of view -i.e. the "preferences as given" argument -it proves that Arrow, in spite of his seeming step backwards in 1983, is not totally convinced by In the last section, Samuelson (1987: 170) And he adds a few lines further that Bergson "authorizes" him to say that that was what Bergson had in mind when he wrote his 1954 paper and in further discussions they had had since (PASP, Bergson to Samuelson, August 6, 1985) . As such, it has to be acknowledged that this late statement perhaps did not come as much of a surprise to Arrow for he already made this point notably in 1963, as stated in my introduction.
In spite of this clarification, it is worth noting that the same kind of dissatisfaction manifest in Arrow's answer to Kelly regarding Samuelson's stubborn commitment to making a clear distinction between what he calls mathematical politics and welfare economics seems to be still valid today, as attested notably by Fleurbaey and Mongin (2005: 406) Samuelson submitted it first to The Quarterly Journal of Economics (PASP, Samuelson to Maskin, July 24, 1985) , but facing the referees' reports, finally prefers to withdraw it (PASP, Samuelson to Maskin, February 10, 1986) . Arrow was one of his referees (PASP, Arrow to Samuelson, December 9, 1985) but did not discuss in his report the issue we are interested in.
welfare economics as well as from the point of view of electoral procedures" (Email from Salles to the author, February 6, 2016).
Indeed, after the end of the seventies, the debate regarding social choice and its diverse attributes has mainly been pursued inside what one could call the social choice or the normative economics community, largely and sadly ignored by mainstream economists. This view is notably endorsed by Salles (2014: 8) . It is pertinent to stress that in the same period, some of the main economics journals, Econometrica and The Review of Economic Studies, decided no longer to include social choice theoretical papers, or at least to require a higher standard of acceptance for them (Salles 2005; Suzumura in Bossert and Fleurbaey 2015) . 
V. Samuelson's last lonely battles in the defense of Bergson's edifice
In spite of the efforts made by Samuelson to distinguish Arrow's and B-S functions once and for all, it is clear both from the Suzumura interview (conducted in 2000), and above all from the archival material, that he continued until the end of his life to believe that Arrow had never made enough effort to clarify this issue, which had lead to a persistent and growing misunderstanding inside the scientific community:
when [Arrow] brought out his new edition [1963] , he must have known the objection of Bergson [1952] ; he must have known the objection of Little [1954}; and I think In his answer, Little apologized: "how can I excuse my neglect of your reply to Kemp and Ng?" (PASP, Little to Samuelson, November 18, 1999 Bergson, November 3, 1975) . Indeed, his efforts to pursue his works in welfare economics were rejected on many occasions. In the seventies, his wish to revise his 1966 book has been declined by the Harvard University Press (ABP, Hall to Bergson, November 20, 1972) . Later in the eighties, when the Press was short of supply, they still decided not to reprint it out for "its modest sales make it unfeasible to reprint your book" (ABP, O'Donnell to Bergson, September 29, 1988) . But these are not Bergson's only defeats.
On the occasion of the two Arrow volumes, Feiwel noted that "to his and our regret Abe
Bergson was unable to provide the essay 'Welfare Economics and Social Choice Revisited' that he planned to write for this study of Arrow's contributions" (1987a: 166 fn 19) . In 1994, a paper of him providing a retrospect on the B-S SWF was rejected by the Journal of Economic Literature (ABP, Pencavel to Bergson, January 7, 1994) As a guilty feeling vis-à-vis one of his oldest friends? As is stated by Hands (2014: 112) who dealt with the reasons for Samuelson's change of mind regarding Revealed Preference Theory, "it is possible that answers to such questions would require more investigation into psychology and personal motivation than is appropriate for historians of economic thought, but they certainly are interesting questions." Thus, without going to this kind of extreme explanation relative to guilt or so forth, one can claim at least that, when he fully realized that the misunderstanding concerning both kinds of social welfare functions had been "growing explosively" (PASP, Samuelson to Suzumura and Little, April 15, 2005) , he surely nursed some regrets for not having done more in the past in the defense of his friend's work not simply for scientific reasons, or as a matter of pride, but rather out of his amity for Bergson.
VI. Conclusion
Here we are at the end of this controversy, which has taken place over fifty years, in public and behind the scenes, involving many actors, and with the emergence of the social choice community as a backdrop. Meanwhile, notably under the deep influence of Sen's works, the field has further evolved to another stage, less welfarist, and which includes nonutility information in its framework, such as rights or capabilities. As stressed by Feldman (2008) and Baujard (2016) , the works in implementation theory, economics of happiness, or equity theory also offer promising avenues of research. On the other hand, Samuelson seems to have been slow to fully grasp the scale of the growing misunderstanding regarding this issue, and his attempts to staunch the controversy come too late, even setting aside that most of his papers in defense were not published in scientific journals but in collective books. His rejection of Arrow's impossibility theorem outside of welfare economics and his praise of the condition of independence of irrelevant alternatives as if it was irrelevant for his own framework witness his resistance to the social choice theoretical formalism, which -apart from Arrow's seminal works -he does not seem to have held in high esteem. Indeed, speaking about the condition of neutrality, he claimed for instance that "it tells us something about the state of present-day 'social choice' writing that such an axiom would be considered even momentarily as applying to Bergsonian welfare As such, the social choice theoretical formalism amounts to denying any real interest to the B-S SWF, and this could explain Samuelson's not very enthusiastic stance towards it. In the end, it appears that his grief against Arrow's ambiguities regarding both kinds of social welfare functions seem to be better interpreted in terms of his life-time friendship with
Bergson. But as recently pointed out by Hands (2014: 112) , "Samuelson very seldom sheds any serious light on any of the relevant issues, and yet he seems continually compelled to say something." After all, this too could be a good explanation.
